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TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA  
(SFO-GVA-VII): TELEMETRY MEETING, DECEMBER 13, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator.  
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-137.

12. (U) Meeting Date: December 13, 2009  
Time: 3:05 p.m. to 3:50 p.m.  
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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13. (S) This was the fourth meeting to discuss telemetry provisions to be included in the START Follow-On Treaty. The U.S. side requested the meeting and developed a set of questions to which they wanted answers in order to better understand the Russian proposal on telemetry provisions that was provided earlier in the day to U.S. Head of Delegation Rose Gottemoeller.

14. (S) The Russian proposal was to provide for the exchange of unencrypted telemetry data and interpretive data on up to five flight tests on each side each year, with the specific flights chosen by the conducting Party. This exchange would be on a parity basis, with total number of flight tests with data exchange and the mix of ICBM and SLBM flight tests the same on both sides. Any flight tests from UK Trident submarines would have mandatory exchange and would count in the U.S. SLBM flight test quota. The provisions for exchange of data and communication of the flights selected would be negotiated in the next phase and included in the Annex. Coordination of the data exchanges and handling of other details would take place within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). End summary.

¶5. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: When does encryption apply?; Who decides which launches?; What is the meaning of parity?

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WHEN DOES ENCRYPTION APPLY?  
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¶6. (S) Mr. Siemon explained to Gen. Poznikhir that he requested this meeting to better understand the Russian proposal for telemetry provisions to be included in the START Follow-On Treaty that was provided to HOD Gottemoeller earlier in the day. The Russian proposal follows.

Begin text:

Document of the Russian side  
December 12, 2009

Proposal of the Russian Side on Language for Telemetry

For a three-year period beginning from the date of entry into force of the treaty, the Parties shall exchange telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no more than five launches of ICBMs and SLBMs per year.

In addition, if Trident II SLBM launches take place on behalf of Great Britain, telemetric information about them shall be included in the annual quota of the U.S. side.

The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out for an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted by the sides, and in an agreed amount.

After three years of treaty implementation, the sides shall consider the conditions and method of further telemetric information exchange on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

End Text.

¶7. (S) Poznikhir thanked his American counterparts for their quick reaction to the Russian proposal. He pointed out the text had been reviewed by President Medvedev personally and read word-for-word by him during his phone call with President Obama on December 12, 2009. Siemon began addressing a list of questions that the U.S. side had prepared to clarify key points in the proposal. The list of questions follows.

Begin List.

Questions on the December 12, 2009 Russian Telemetry Proposal

¶1. Will launches be encrypted or unencrypted? Will the five launches for which telemetric information will be exchanged be handled differently from the others?

¶2. Which Party determines the five launches for which telemetric information will be exchanged?

¶3. Are recorded media, playback equipment, and interpretive data included in the Russian concept?

¶4. How would the parity concept work for selecting the number of flight tests?

¶5. Where and how would additional details be recorded?

¶6. Will flight test notifications under the 1988 Agreement contain additional information on broadcast frequencies, modulation types, and the use of encryption?

¶7. Will the exchange of telemetry include all telemetry broadcast during the flight test? Does this include telemetry from a reentry vehicle? Will telemetry that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM be broadcast through the

reentry vehicle?

¶8. How would your proposal relate to flight tests of prototype ICBMs or SLBMs?

End List.

¶8. (S) Siemon asked whether the launches would be encrypted or unencrypted. Poznikhir responded that flight tests could be either encrypted or unencrypted at the choice of the Party conducting the flight test. Each side would have the right to encrypt all launches but that did not mean that all flight tests necessarily would be encrypted. He pointed to the recent example of the flight test of a Bulava missile which broadcast unencrypted data although that was no longer a requirement under the START Treaty.

¶9. (S) Siemon next asked whether the five launches for which telemetric information would be exchanged would be handled differently from other flight tests. He clarified that pre-launch notifications under START provided the information about whether or not a flight was to be encrypted. He questioned whether, on a normal basis, the Russian Federation would encrypt data during flight tests and whether these five launches would be exceptions to this rule. Poznikhir repeated that each side had the right to encrypt and that it was not an obligation but a choice. Each Party would also have the right to select five launches for which to exchange data. He remarked that the U.S. side was probably interested in knowing if the Russian flight tests of missiles in development would be encrypted. He stated that when a Party intended to exchange data, encryption would probably not be used so that the other side would have access to the data.

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WHO DECIDES WHICH LAUNCHES?  
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¶10. (S) Siemon next asked which Party would determine the five launches for which telemetric information would be exchanged. Poznikhir replied that the Party conducting the flight tests would select the flights on which it would exchange data. He added that all the technical details for exchange of flight test data would need to be discussed and finalized during the negotiations on the Annex before the Bilateral Consultative Commission could be convened and oversee this process. Siemon agreed that specific details of the flight test data exchanges would be recorded in the Annex and that at the end of three years, the BCC could decide the future of the data exchange process. He asked if the Russian side envisioned the process working similar to START, in which flight tests were routinely unencrypted, with the right to encrypt for a limited number each year. Poznikhir replied in the negative, saying that the new agreement would provide for five launches each year with data exchange and that all others could be encrypted or not by the choice of the Party conducting them. Mr. Engelhardt asked for clarification using the example of a Party conducting ten launches, with seven encrypted by its own choice. In that case, would the Party provide data for only the three unencrypted flights or also for two of the encrypted flights as well? Poznikhir replied that, according to parity, if one side only provided data on three flights, the other side would provide data on only three of its flights. He commented that he did not believe it was possible to exchange data on encrypted flights.

¶11. (S) Siemon remarked that the U.S. was not in a position to make commitments for the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, to clarify the Russian proposal, he asked whether the UK would be obligated to provide data for all of its flight tests in a given year. Poznikhir referred to the wording in the Russian proposal, saying that the number of UK submarine flights for which data would be exchanged could be discussed in the BCC but that if the UK decided to conduct launches, the Russian side should be able to have access to the data. Siemon asked whether the U.S. would have the option of declaring that a particular UK flight test would not apply to its quota.

Poznikhir replied that the UK flight tests would be mandatory. If, for instance, the U.S. and Russia agreed to exchange data on two SLBM flights and three ICBM flights, one of the two SLBM flights would be a UK test if one was conducted.

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WHAT IS THE MEANING OF PARITY?  
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¶12. (S) Siemon asked how the parity concept would work in selecting the number of flight tests. Would parity mean equal numbers of flight tests and agreement on the SLBM/ICBM mix and would the U.S. and UK have to agree on the flight test obligations? Poznikhir replied the categories of SLBM and ICBM flights seemed correct but that the U.S. and Russia should carefully think over and discuss the options, then decide at a later time what the best way to implement would be. Zaitsev remarked that the original Russian concept had been to allow exchange data on any five launches but that they believed it would be better to decide together.

¶13. (S) Siemon then asked whether the exchange would include recorded media and interpretive data? Poznikhir replied in the affirmative and went on to say that in the past, the U.S. and Russia have also exchanged playback equipment. For those pieces of playback equipment that continued to apply, there was no need for an additional exchange. As new equipment was introduced, there would be a need to work out exchanges in the future. Siemon asked whether prototype ICBM and SLBM flights would be included in the data exchanges. Poznikhir replied that all flight tests would be eligible for exchange.

¶14. (S) Siemon remarked that the proposed language the Russian side had provided would best fit in the protocol but that additional language was necessary to clarify what would be included in the Annex. The basic treaty provides agreement of the sides on a commitment ) the protocol needs to provide enough definition to describe how it will be implemented. Poznikhir replied that would be developed by the BCC or a special group of experts during subsequent negotiations in Geneva, Moscow, or Washington. The proposed text for the protocol had been provided by the Russian President himself and could not be corrected. Siemon suggested that some clarifying information could be added on how to negotiate the more detailed provisions. The sides would explain in the protocol the process for reaching agreement and where in the documentation the agreements would be recorded. Specific provisions would then be agreed upon during the development of the Annex.

¶15. (S) Poznikhir clarified his vision for determining the flight tests on which data would be exchanged in a given year using the principle of parity. One way would be for the BCC to discuss and determine which launches would apply by the end of the year for the following year. Another would be to provide notifications in advance communicating which launches would apply. Siemon suggested that the best way would be for the Parties to agree as they developed the Annex, describing what the BCC process would be, and recording the agreed process in the Annex so that both sides would have a clear picture of how it would work.

¶16. (S) Siemon reiterated that the most difficult part for the U.S., in considering the Russian proposal, was that the U.S. was not in a position to make commitments for the UK. The U.S. would have no objection to an agreement on telemetry data exchange between the UK and the Russian Federation. Siemon observed that the UK and Russian Federation had cooperated on nuclear programs in the past and suggested that may be a better venue in which to discuss such a data exchange. Poznikhir remarked that this agreement should instead be between the U.S. and UK because he believed the U.S. made use of the data from UK flights. Both Parties agreed they would support the discussions to develop the Annex.

¶17. (S) Documents exchanged:

Provided to the Russian side:

None

Provided to the U.S. side:

None

¶18. (S) List of Participants

U.S.

Mr. Siemon

Mr. Engelhardt

Lt Col Goodman

Ms. Pura

Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen. Poznikhir

Col. Zaitsev

Mr. Pogodin (Int)

CLINTON